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Judging  the  Singular:  Towards  a  Contingent  Practice  of  Improvisation  in  Law  
  
Kathryn  McNeilly  and  Paul  Stapleton  
  
Introducing  the  Contingent  
  
In  law  the  role  of  the  judge  is  seminal,  both  as  a  symbolic  figure  representing  justice  to  the  layperson  and  as  the  
practical  arbitrator  among  competing  interests  in  the  adversarial  common  law  system.  A  canon  of  thought  has  
emerged  pertaining  to  judges  and  judicial  decision-­making:  the  way  in  which  judges  approach  the  task  of  
responding  to  each  case  in  front  of  them,  and  the  resources  they  use  to  do  so.  This  includes  conventional  
understandings  of  the  judge’s  role  as  that  of  a  detached,  neutral  mediator,  as  well  as  development  of  substantial  
critiques  of  such  understandings  in  the  form  of  procedural  justice,  therapeutic  jurisprudence,  and  feminist  
approaches  to  judging  (Hunter  et  al.).  These  latter  approaches  have  done  much  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  
a  more  active  and  engaged  role  for  the  judge  to  ensure  fairness  and  respect  (Tyler;;  Lind  and  Tyler),  facilitate  
emotional,  psychological  and  physical  wellbeing  of  individuals  engaged  in  the  justice  system  (King;;  Wexler),  and  
be  attentive  to  the  gendered  nature  of  law  and  justice  (Hunter)  respectively.  In  this  piece,  we  aim  to  add  to  such  
literature,  considering  how  judicial  decision-­making,  and  the  skills  involved  in  this  activity  as  a  practice  of  judging  
the  singular,  may  be  productively  thought  through  in  terms  of  improvisation.1  The  tools  of  improvisation,  and  a  
grasp  of  improvisation  as  an  important,  emancipatory  social  practice,2  facilitate  insights  into  judging  which  are  not  
possible  by  other  means.  From  this  we  encourage  judges  to  consciously  think  of  their  role  in  improvisational  
terms:  to  actively  engage  in  a  critical  practice  of  improvisation  in  law  that  is  directed  towards  enhancing  just  
outcomes  for  each  case  they  judge  on.    
  
In  undertaking  this  exploration  we  draw  upon  qualitative  interview  data  with  judges  working  in  the  area  of  family  
law  and  professional  improvising  musicians3  collected  during  the  course  of  the  Arts  and  Humanities  Research  
Council  funded  project  Into  the  Key  of  Law:  Transposing  Musical  Improvisation.  The  Case  of  Child  Protection  in  
Northern  Ireland.4  This  project  is  unique  in  its  interdisciplinary  grounding  and  in  engaging  the  study  and  discipline  
of  law  with  that  of  music.  The  aim  of  the  project  is  to  draw  upon  the  concepts  and  practices  of  improvisation  in  
music  to  explore  space  for,  and  indeed  already  existing  practices  of,  improvisation  in  law.  Initially,  law  may  seem  
a  highly  unlikely  site  for  improvisation  given  the  centrality  of  tradition,  precedent,  predictability,  and  stability  in  its  
underpinnings.  In  fact,  the  judge-­made  common  law  that  exists  alongside  statute  law  in  jurisdictions  such  as  the  
United  Kingdom,  Canada,  India,  Hong  Kong,  Australia,  and  the  United  States  of  America,  offers  not  only  inherent  
possibilities  for,  but  also  requires  improvisation  in  the  course  of  its  everyday  activity  (Ramshaw,  Justice).  Law  is,  
at  its  heart,  a  practice,  not  a  text,  involving  response  to  an  individual  case  within  a  system  of  precedent  using  the  
legal  and  practical  resources  that  are  available.  Currently,  improvisation  appears  as  a  subtle,  tacit  practice  
employed  by  judges,  lawyers,  and  other  professionals  involved  in  the  legal  system,  although  rarely  consciously  
thought  of  as  such.  Here  is  where  productive  space  exists  for  improvisational  thought  to  provide  insights  into  
judging  and  for  a  consciously  critical  practice  of  improvisation  to  emerge.  
  
It  is  important  to  note  that  while  we  do  not  wish  to  merely  observe  and  stay  with  a  tacit  practice  of  improvisation,  
neither  does  our  work  aim  to  codify  improvisation  in  law—employing  an  abstract  universal  idea  of  what  
improvisation  “is”  that  could  be  straightforwardly  translated  to  the  legal  context.  Rather,  what  we  seek  to  do  is  to  
advance  a  contingent  approach  to  and  practice  of  improvisation  in  law,  one  that  is  grounded  in  the  context  within  
which  it  takes  place  and  is  inherently  open  to  responsive  development  and  change  based  upon  this  context.5  
Improvisation  is  not  a  “static”  concept  engaged  in  the  same  way  in  various  contexts  and  locations;;  it  must  be  
viewed  as  emerging  from  particular  contexts,  constantly  shaped,  articulated,  and  rearticulated  within  and  in  
response  to  such.  To  encourage  a  critical  practice  of  improvisation  in  law,  therefore,  we  must  begin  with  the  
contingent.  In  what  follows  below,  drawing  from  qualitative  data  collected  as  part  of  the  Into  the  Key  of  Law  
project,  we  engage  with  what  already  exists  in  relation  to  improvisation  in  legal  practice,  judicial  work  specifically,  
and  use  this  as  a  basis  to  argue  for  a  more  conscious  development  of  a  critical  approach  to  improvisation  in  law.  
By  exploring  how  judges  characterize  their  work  and  the  skills  this  work  involves,  we  begin  to  gather  a  sense  of  
how  they  engage  with  improvisation  in  their  everyday  role,  and  where  judges’  thinking  on  improvisation  and  its  
relation  to  judicial  work  may  be  developed  in  a  more  critical  and  conscious  direction.  We  have  broken  down  
discussion  into  a  number  of  themes  where  judging  can  be  thought  to  involve  key  improvisational  elements  and  
judicial  skills  stand  to  be  explored  further,  and  critically  honed,  as  improvisational:  singularity,  anticipation,  




Encounters  with  singularity/generality  and  the  idea  of  “judging  the  singular”  is  a  crucial  part  of  the  judicial  role.  
Judging  singularity  within  the  wider  confines  of  precedent  involves  judges  making  use  of  key  improvisational  
techniques,  and  the  resources  of  improvisation  are  useful  to  think  through  more  closely  what  is  involved  in  this  
activity.  While  judges  are  bound  by  a  system  of  common  law  precedent  that  requires  application  of  pre-­existing  
rules  to  the  case  in  front  of  them,  each  case  remains  unique  and  demanding  of  a  unique  response.  Each  time  a  
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judge  gives  judgment  they  are  improvising  in  the  sense  of  offering  a  particular  result  in  the  particular  case  they  
are  judging  on  (MacLean  124).  No  two  cases,  however,  are  the  same  and  the  system  of  precedent,  therefore,  
always  involves  improvisation  in  the  sense  of  using  and  adapting  already  existing  rules  in  a  slightly  different  or  
new  way  each  time,  rather  than  merely  applying  a  rule  directly.  As  Sara  Ramshaw  states,    
  
Improvisation  in  judgment  calls  for  ongoing,  practical  decision-­making  as  the  constant  negotiation  
between  the  freedom  of  the  judge  to  take  account  of  the  otherness  or  singularity  of  the  case  and  the  
existing  laws  or  rules  that  both  allow  for  and  constrain  that  freedom  (Justice  3,  emphasis  in  
original).    
  
Engagement  with  singularity  is  also  a  key  skill  of  improvising  musicians.  As  musician  John  Butcher  outlines,  
“You’re  playing  something  and  listening  with  the  intention  of  moving  from  A  to  B  in  the  next  moment,  and  then  
something  happens  in  the  music,  which  you  hear,  and  you  realize,  “Ok,  that  would  be  a  bad  choice.  I’ve  got  to  do  
something  else.”  Just  as  improvising  musicians  must  always  come  to  each  improvisation  anew  but  with  the  
knowledge  and  experience  of  music,  their  instrument  and  past  improvisational  encounters,  so  too  are  judges  
inherently  involved  in  improvisation  each  time  they  are  called  to  give  judgment  in  a  case.  Judges  must  come  to  
each  case  anew,  must  recognise  and  engage  with  its  singularity,  but  do  so  using  the  legal  resources  available  to  
them  and  within  the  wider  temporal  context  of  the  case  at  hand.  This  latter  point  is  very  important  in  family  law  
cases  that  may  extend  over  a  significant  duration.    
  
In  our  interviews  judges  did  indeed  appear  to  be  aware  of  the  tension  between  singularity  and  generality  
characterizing  their  work,  and  the  need  to  attentively  negotiate  the  tension  between  the  two.  As  one  judge  
explained,  “The  legal  principles  are  straightforward.  What  is  difficult  in  family  work  is  applying  those  
principles  to  every  single  case  because  every  case  is  so  different  and  so  unique.”  Another  judge  
commented  that,  “It's  very  rare  that  you  get  identical  sort  of  circumstances  in  two  different  cases,  and  by  
their  very  nature  the  judge  has  to  weigh  the  competing  considerations  and  decide  how  much  significance  
to  give  to  this  and  how  much  to  that.”  From  such  comments,  judges  may  already  perceive  their  role  as  
requiring  constant  navigation  of  singularity  in  the  context  of  a  wider  system  of  precedent  and  the  need  to  
riff  on  it  each  time  they  judge,  and  the  challenges  this  can  involve.  Space  exists  to  build  upon  this  
awareness,  and  to  consciously  conceptualize  this  as  an  improvisatory  skill  to  be  honed.  A  critical  practice  
of  improvisation  in  law  would  stress  the  improvisational  task  of  responding  to  singularity  as  forming  the  
heart  of  our  common  law  system.  In  better  recognizing  this  activity  of  improvisation,  possibilities  emerge  to  
foreground  the  singular  and  what  it  demands,  how  justice  can  be  done  in  a  case.  This  is  especially  
important  in  family  law  where  singularity  takes  on  a  crucial  significance.  In  the  words  of  one  judge,  “these  
cases  are  very,  very  fact-­specific.”  In  this  area  of  law  no  two  families  or  situations  are  the  same,  and  
attention  to  the  singularity  of  each  case  is  particularly  important  to  reach  a  uniquely  just  outcome  for  each  
child  and  family.  The  importance  of  attention  to  singularity  for  the  judge  in  family  law  work  is  emphasised  
by  the  fact  that  in  this  area,  in  contrast  to  other  areas  of  civil  law  or  the  criminal  law,  Parliament  has  
afforded  judges  with  a  large  amount  of  room  for  discretion  in  order  to  reach  the  best  outcome.6  This  
statute-­mandated  discretion  to  facilitate  response  to  the  unique  facts  of  family  law  cases  can  be  thought  of  
as  space  for  improvisation,  space  to  improvise  around  the  singularity  of  a  case  to  come  to  a  uniquely  just  
result  within  the  context  of  the  system  of  legal  rules  and  precedent  within  the  area  of  law  more  generally.  
Thinking  in  this  way  holds  potential  to  allow  judges  to  further  and  more  consciously  engage  the  tension  
between  singularity  and  generality  in  their  work  and  the  skills  involved  in  finding  an  outcome  for  each  case  
that  is  unique—tailored  justice  emerging  from  the  practice  of  improvisation  as  citation  or  iteration  of  
precedent  as  always  (re)iteration  in  the  context  of  each  uniquely  singular  case.  
  
Recognising  the  singularity  of  every  case,  and  the  skills  of  improvisation  inherent  in  the  common  law  system  of  
precedent  as  (re)iteration  and  using  this  to  stimulate  a  conscious,  critical  practice  of  improvisation  in  law,  
however,  also  involves  something  else.  It  requires  recognition  that  there  can  be  no  “right  answer”  to  a  legal  case.  
Legal  scholar  Ronald  Dworkin  famously  asserted,  “in  most  hard  cases  there  are  right  answers  to  be  hunted  by  
reason  and  imagination”  (Law’s  Empire  viii-­ix).  For  Dworkin,  a  right  answer  to  a  hard  case  can  be  found  by  a  
judge,  presented  as  a  fully  knowledgeable  and  wise  Hercules,  through  employment  of  legal  rules  and  principles.7  
This  view,  however,  has  been  heavily  critiqued.  Legal  realists  and  the  Critical  Legal  Studies  movement  have  
asserted  that  law  is,  in  fact,  indeterminate  and  that  multiple  potential  answers  exist  to  any  legal  dilemma  
(Kennedy;;  Kress;;  Tushnet).  For  such  scholarship,  the  answer  a  judge  delivers  depends  on  a  number  of  factors,  
including  existing  law,  the  time  and  practical  resources  available,  policy  and  personal  political  views,  and  also  the  
potential  for  appeal  and  any  damage  that  may  result  to  their  reputation  (Kennedy  526-­528).  Understanding  
judging  through  the  lens  of  improvisation  builds  on  the  insights  of  such  work;;  it  involves  moving  beyond  the  
binary  of  right/wrong,  not  being  constrained  by  the  idea  that  a  right  answer  to  every  case  exists,  and  
foregrounding  that  justice  is  made,  not  found,  invented  anew  rather  than  pre-­existing.  It  also  adds,  however,  to  
such  previous  work.  Conceiving  judging  as  a  critical  practice  of  improvisation  involves  understanding  the  activity  
of  negotiating  the  continuum  of  potential  answers  to  a  case  as  an  explicit  act  of  improvisation,  and  encourages  
judges  to  learn  how  to  negotiate  this  continuum  as  an  improvisational  skill.    
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Conceptualizing  answers  to  the  singularity  of  a  case  as  existing  in  multiple  forms  indeed  appears  
compatible  with  how  some  judges  already  view  their  role.  As  one  judge  we  spoke  to  stated,  “There  is  a  
range  of  reasonable  responses.  It's  on  a  continuum  .  .  .  there's  certainly  plenty  of  times  when  it's  very  hard  
to  know  what  answer  to  arrive  at.”  Another  judge  added  that,  “There  are  a  range  of  options  available  to  you  
and  provided  you  chose  one  of  the  options,  which  fall  within  the  spectrum  of  reasonable  responses  to  a  
particular  decision,  there  should  not  be  interference  with  your  judgment.”  Acknowledging  that  there  is  a  
range  of  responses  to  a  case  encourages  a  more  open  and  responsive  mind,  characterizing  the  judge’s  
function  as  being  about  identifying  and  navigating  all  possible  “answers”  to  find  one  that  might  best  
respond  to  the  singularity  of  the  case  at  hand.  The  skill  to  be  honed  is  to  encourage  judges  to  engage  with  
the  entirety  of  the  facts  in  front  of  them  to  reach  the  answer  that  best  achieves  justice.  In  learning  to  do  so,  
improvisational  resources  may  be  drawn  from.  These  include  the  ideas  of  adaptability  and  listening,  which  
are  discussed  below.  Translated  to  the  legal  context,  these  ideas  would  encourage  judges  to  stay  present  
with  a  case,  and  remain  open  to  negotiation  of  the  spectrum  of  possible  answers  before  them,  in  a  manner  
that  is  informed  by  engagement  with  all  that  surrounds  them  in  the  context  of  a  case.  Only  through  careful  
and  holistic  attentiveness  to  singularity  and  the  uniqueness  of  facts  can  the  best  possible  answer  emerge.  
Such  improvisatory  resources  can  take  existing  thoughts  on  judicial  practice  further,  not  merely  observing  
that  there  are  multiple  answers  to  a  case  and  highlighting  the  resources  that  judges  use  to  reach  an  
answer,  but  offering  tangible  tools  to  facilitate  reaching  of  answers  in  a  way  that  is  grounded  in  an  ethical  
approach  to  the  world  around  us.  
  
Acknowledging  that  there  is  no  “right  answer”  to  be  found,  which  follows  from  thinking  of  singularity  and  
generality  in  legal  practice  in  improvisational  terms,  may  have  challenging  implications.  A  critical  practice  of  
improvisation  includes  acknowledging  that  there  is  not  one  right  answer  to  seemingly  “clear  cut”  cases,  
encouraging  a  full  exploration  of  all  the  possible  options  on  the  continuum  where  the  tendency  may  
otherwise  be  to  remain  blind  to  these.  This  is  especially  the  case  in  family  law  where  the  facts  judges  are  
dealing  with  may  be  harrowing,  and  pressure  is  exerted  by  public  opinion  and  the  media  in  light  of  highly  
publicized  abuse  cases  such  as  Baby  P  (see  Warner),  to  reach  a  particular  result.  As  one  judge  
commented,  “Well,  there  are  .  .  .  cases  where  there  is  an  obvious  right  answer.  One  of  them  is  a  sex  abuse  
case,  for  example.  Significant  violence,  something  of  that  sort,  you  know,  where  really  there  is  nothing  else  
to  be  done.”  Embracing  a  critical  improvisational  approach,  this  judge  would  acknowledge  that  while  on  
first  glance  there  may  appear  to  be  an  “obvious  right  answer,”  that  this  cannot  be  predetermined  and  exists  
in  a  field  of  other  potential  answers.  Any  such  answer  still  requires  consideration  alongside  other  
possibilities  on  the  continuum  to  avoid  a  silencing  of  singularity  and  prevention  of  possibilities  for  justice  to  
be  done.  Asserting  that  there  is  no  “right  answer”  in  such  cases  does  not  mean  evading  taking  a  tough  
stance  when  required,  but  it  does  encourage  judges  to  stay  with  the  singularity  of  every  case  and  to  always  




The  second  theme  emerging  from  our  engagements  with  judges  which  demonstrates  an  already  existing  tacit  
practice  of  improvisation  in  law  which  stands  to  be  reflected  on  further  is  that  of  anticipation.  Anticipation  is  a  key  
element  of  improvisation  in  music.8  It  offers  both  possibilities  and  challenges  for  improvisers.  As  musician  Maria  
Chavez  comments  from  her  practice,    
  
Anticipation  is  tricky  because  there  are  moments  where  you  want  to  create  a  sound,  but  you’re  
also  waiting  for  the  right  moment.  When  I  have  that  moment  of  anticipation  where  I  want  to  make  
that  sound,  but  it  doesn’t  happen  for  one  reason  or  another,  it  becomes  something  completely  
different.  It  unexpectedly  changes  the  whole  sculpture  of  the  sound  piece.  
  
This  is  a  concept  that  appears  to  also  be  highly  important  to  the  judicial  role.  Anticipation  emerged  from  our  
research  as  holding  potential  both  to  hinder,  as  pre-­judging,  but  also  to  enhance,  judicial  work.  The  tools  of  
improvisation  can  assist  in  making  visible  both  sides  of  anticipation  and  provide  resources  for  judges  to  navigate  
them.  
  
Naturally,  judges  may  encounter  a  case  and  on  first  reading  find  they  are  anticipating  what  this  case  is  about  or  
what  it  requires.  Following  rejection  of  the  idea  that  there  can  be  a  “right  answer”  to  be  found,  however,  it  is  
necessary  to  look  at  anticipation  in  judging  in  a  slightly  different  way.  Understandably,  refusing  the  possibility  of  a  
right  answer,  especially  in  difficult  cases,  in  favor  of  a  more  open  response  to  the  singularity  of  each  case  may  
generate  anxiety  for  those  engaging  in  decision-­making  activity.  In  addition  to  the  challenge  this  poses  to  
traditional  ways  of  thinking  about  law  and  the  judicial  role,  limited  economic  resources  and  a  sensitivity  to  avoid  
delay  in  resolving  cases  may  lead  to  a  preference  for  the  general  and  make  it  difficult  to  stay  with  a  foregrounding  
of  the  singular.  This,  taken  to  its  more  dangerous  and  extreme  ends,  can  lead  to  a  tendency  to  pre-­judge,  to  
anticipate  what  a  case  is  about  or  what  justice  in  this  case  would  look  like  without  fully  engaging  with  the  singular.  
The  critical  improvisational  approach  we  are  advancing  seeks  to  bring  a  greater  awareness  of  pre-­judging  
through  making  the  improvisatory  role  of  judges  more  explicit.  While  such  an  approach  to  pre-­judging  was  not  the  
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predominant  tendency  amongst  our  interviewees,  its  dangers  in  judicial  work  in  the  contemporary  economic  
context  were  perceptible.  As  one  judge  commented,  “don't  make  a  case  complicated,  unless  it  has  curious  or  
unique  features.  Most  cases  don't.  By  far  and  away,  most  cases  have  more  or  less  the  same  issues.”  This  is  a  
problematic  approach  from  the  perspective  of  seeking  just  outcomes,  and  one  that  engaging  in  a  consciously  
critical  practice  of  improvisation  would  serve  to  guard  against.    
  
In  contrast  to  pre-­judging,  thinking  about  judicial  decision-­making  as  an  inherently  improvisational  activity  and  
advancing  critical  engagement  with  this  idea  gesture  toward  the  need  for  anticipation  in  judicial  decision-­making  
that  is  open,  alert,  and  responsive  to  singularity.  Foregrounding  and  responding  to  singularity  are  not  advanced  
here  as  involving  purely  unrestrained  activity  where  judges  can  never  know  what  the  outcome  may  be  and  come  
to  the  endeavor  of  judging  completely  unprepared.  Rather,  engaging  in  a  critical  practice  of  improvisation  
involves  judges  seeking  to  manage  singularity  through  a  number  of  strategies,  one  of  which  is  an  alertness  and  
anticipation  of  singularity  within  a  wider  context  of  generality  and  judicial  experience.  Judges  will  bring  their  
experience  of  past  cases  and  knowledge  of  law  to  each  new  judgment,  but  instead  of  allowing  this  experience  to  
lead  to  a  form  of  pre-­judgment  which  closes  down  possibilities  for  meaningful  engagement  of  what  justice  in  this  
case  may  look  like,  such  experience  may  be  employed  to  aid  an  alertness.  This  means  adopting  a  sense  of  
anticipation  of  what  this  case  might  require  and  might  involve  which  keeps  judges  engaged  with  the  singular  with  
an  eye  to  precedence  and  their  past  experience  more  generally.    
  
Good  judicial  decision-­making  can  be  regarded  as  always  about  anticipation  in  the  form  of  an  alertness  grounded  
in,  but  not  clouded  by,  experience  that  is  beneficial  to  the  particular  case  at  hand.  Improvising  musicians  also  
make  use  of  anticipation  when  they  draw  on  previous  knowledge,  techniques,  and  experience  to  shape  their  
improvisational  trajectory,  but  are  willing  to  let  go  of  these  habits  if  they  do  not  match  with  the  demands  of  
specific  moments.  The  danger  of  relying  too  much  on  prior  technique  is  observed  by  musician  Bennett  Hogg  who  
states,  “I’ve  played  with  people  who  have  too  much  drilled  technique  in  their  approach.  They  are  actually  difficult  
to  improvise  with  because  there’s  this  level  of  inflexibility.”  Musician  Bonnie  Jones  also  emphasizes  that  
improvisatory  action  is  not  purely  spontaneous,  not  fully  unanticipated,  as  you  always  act  with  “the  sum  total  of  
your  experience  as  a  human  being  up  to  that  point.”  Accordingly,  moves  towards  a  more  critical  practice  of  
improvisation  in  law  would  involve  judges  being  aware  of  the  extent  to  which  they  do  anticipate,  while  remaining  
sensitive  to  how  their  experience  and  knowledge  contributes  to  or  impedes  this  process.  Thus,  we  aim  to  
encourage  an  alert  form  of  anticipation  that  is  accompanied  by  an  open-­minded  ability  to  acknowledge  that  things  




A  third  theme  emerging  from  our  discussions  with  judges  that  appears  central  to  thinking  through  a  critical  
practice  of  improvisation  in  law  grounded  in  contingency  is  that  of  responsiveness  or  adaptability.  Skillful  
improvisers  cope  with  unexpected  situations  and  see  opportunities  to  exploit  within  these  situations.  
Musician  Matthew  Bourne  states,  “You’ve  kind  of  a  rough  idea  in  mind  as  to  what  you  are  there  to  do.  But,  
at  any  given  moment  that  could  change;;  and  I  think  the  skill  is  adapting,  and  including  those  disturbances.  
They  are  unexpected  and  do  come  into  the  narrative  of  what  you  are  doing.”  Clear  parallels  can  be  found  
between  the  skills  of  improvisers  in  this  regard  and  judges.  In  our  interviews,  judges  stated  that  a  key  part  
of  their  role  was  to  adapt  and  respond  to  facts  of  a  case  and  also  to  continue  to  do  so  as  the  case  
progressed.  Family  law  cases  especially  involve  facts  that  shift  and  change  throughout  the  process,  often  
quite  dramatically.  Being  ready  to  adapt  your  approach  to,  or  understanding  of,  a  case  and  to  respond  
accordingly  is  central  to  the  role  of  a  judge  in  this  area.  
  
The  importance  of  responsiveness  and  adaptability  emerged  as  central  to  what  judges  themselves  regard  as  
good  judicial  decision-­making  amongst  our  interviewees.  As  one  judge  stated,  “it  is  part  of  the  proper  discharge  
of  one’s  function  that  one  is  prepared  to  change  one’s  mind  and  should  be  open  to  thinking  again.”  Similarly,  
another  judge  reflected  on  the  importance  of  responsiveness  and  adaptability  in  the  area  of  family  law  especially:  
  
It  would  not  be  unusual  to  read  a  set  of  papers  and  have  a  preliminary  view,  and  then  hear  oral  
evidence,  or  have  the  evidence  tested—insist  on  the  evidence  being  tested—that  the  social  workers  
want  to  give—and  forming  a  very  different  view.  But,  as  a  judge  I  am  used  to  keeping  a  very  open  
mind  throughout  and  I  think  it’s  vitally  important  in  family  work.    
  
Another  judge  described  their  experience  in  the  following  terms:    
  
Things  can  seem  perfectly  logical  but  then  some  new  piece  of  evidence  emerges  or  someone  looks  
at  a  piece  of  evidence  and  says  something—'ah,  but  no,  that's  not  quite  what  I  meant'—and  they  
put  a  new  slant  on  it,  and  it's  rather  like  a  child  playing  with  a  kaleidoscope,  you  give  it  a  shake  and  
suddenly  the  picture  is  quite  different.  
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Good  judicial  decision-­making,  therefore,  is  adaptable  and  responsive  to  the  singularity  and  shifting  shape  and  
facts  of  each  case  and,  furthermore,  is  consciously  aware  of  the  need  to  be  so.  This  is  a  key  skill  that  a  more  
conscious,  critical  approach  to  improvisation  in  law  would  draw  attention  to.  A  critical  practice  of  improvisation  
would  seek  to  build  on  recognition  of  the  importance  of  responsive  listening  and  acting  in  the  judge’s  role  and  
recognition  of  these  elements  as  skills  that  need  to  be  honed  to  effectively  respond  to  the  singular.  A  central  part  
of  honing  responsiveness  and  adaptability  in  a  critical  practice  of  improvisation  in  law  is  through  the  idea  of  
listening.  To  be  responsive  and  adaptive  in  a  way  that  benefits  the  interests  of  justice,  judges  must  really  listen  to  
the  case  in  front  of  them,  including,  crucially,  to  the  parties  involved.    
  
The  concept  of  listening  has  been  dominant  in  literature  surrounding  judging  and  judge-­craft,  including  judicial  
listening  as  a  skill  to  be  honed  (Mack  and  Anleu).  In  different  ways,  all  critiques  of  conventional  forms  of  judging  
have  emphasized  the  value  of  listening.  This  has  included  listening  to  the  voice  of  the  litigant  (procedural  justice),  
active  listening  and  response  (therapeutic  jurisprudence),  and  listening  to  marginalized  voices/experiences  
(feminist  judging).9  The  approach  to  judging  that  we  advance  picks  up  on  such  attention  to  listening  in  judicial  
work,  but  does  so  drawing  on  a  specific  conception  of  this  term  which  is  rooted  in  critical  studies  in  improvisation  
and  the  conception  of  listening  as  an  important  social  practice  holding  emancipatory  possibility  (Heble  and  
Caines;;  Oliveros  “Deep”).10  This  goes  beyond  previous  conceptions  of  listening  in  the  approaches  to  judging  that  
have  emerged  to  date.    
  
Our  interview  participants  demonstrated  an  awareness  of  the  crucial  difference  that  listening  to  voices,  such  as  
that  of  children  who  are  the  subject  of  legal  proceedings,  can  make  in  judicial  decision-­making,  and  to  the  
ultimate  outcome  of  a  case,  in  family  law.  As  one  judge  stated,    
  
One  boy,  in  particular,  stands  out  in  my  mind.  A  boy  of  14,  who  really  changed  the  direction  of  the  
case  by  wanting  to  see  us,  and  we  then  focused  on  what  his  concerns  were,  and  tried  to  identify  
that  to  the  social  workers  concerned.  It  really  helped  in  that  case,  so,  sometimes  hearing  the  voice  
of  the  child—as  it's  often  put—is  very  important.  
  
The  approach  we  are  advancing,  however,  does  more  than  integrate  the  voice  of  the  child,  or  other  parties,  into  
the  case  and  the  judge’s  decision-­making.  Rather,  it  involves  introducing  an  important  shift  in  how  judges  
understand  and  approach  listening  in  their  work.    
  
Critical  studies  in  improvisation  stress  that  listening  is  a  holistic  activity  that  requires  mutual  
communication.  Listening  emerges,  through  work  such  as  that  of  Pauline  Oliveros  and  her  influential  
conception  of  deep  listening  (Oliveros  Deep  Listening;;  “Deep  Listening  Meditations”),  as  an  activity  that  is  
not  simply  about  hearing  but  which  involves  a  responsibility  to,  and  interaction  with,  all  that  surrounds.  
Listening  in  such  a  deep  and  attentive  way  holds  the  potential  to  be  transformative,  to  connect  us  with  
others  and  the  world  around  us  in  a  more  meaningful  manner.  Our  interviews  with  improvising  musicians  
reflected  this  idea  of  a  holistic,  active  approach  to  listening.  As  musician  Simon  Rose  comments,  “The  
problem  with  listening,  or  the  word  “listening,”  is  that  very  often  it’s  used  in  a  kind  of  sense  like  it’s  dropped  
in  and  therefore  needs  no  qualification.  But  really  it  needs  to  be  active.  Active  listening  can  result  in  
committed  playing.”  In  the  context  of  judicial  decision-­making,  where  listening  is  an  integral  part,  
approaching  this  activity  through  the  lens  of  improvisation  indicates  that  it  is  not  enough  to  merely  listen  to  
someone  in  a  case;;  to  listen  effectively  to  that  person  a  response  is  also  involved.  As  one  judge  in  our  
study  put  it,  you  must  “make  that  person  know  they  have  been  heard.”  A  key  part  of  responsiveness  to  
singularity  in  judicial  work,  therefore,  is  responsive  listening  to  adequately  engage  with  singularity  in  a  
given  case  and  adapt  to  its  ever-­changing  form.  Our  interviews  with  judges  demonstrated  that  listening  is  a  
key  element  of  good  judicial  decision-­making,  and  of  making  sure  justice  is  achieved.  Thinking  of  the  
judge’s  role  as  one  of  improvisation  involves  beginning  to  understand  and  engage  in  listening  as  an  active  
and  responsive  activity,  one  that  is  better  thought  of  as  characterized  by  response  as  opposed  to  mere  
hearing.  Through  actively  conceptualizing  listening  in  such  a  way  judges  can  begin  to  consider  listening  in  





As  noted  above,  responsiveness  and  adaptability  to  the  singularity  of  each  case  is  not  completely  spontaneous  
or  unrestrained  in  the  critical  approach  to  improvisation  in  law  that  we  are  advancing.  This  is  why,  finally,  it  is  
important  to  engage  with  the  idea  of  constraint  which  also  emerged  in  our  interviews  as  a  key  part  of  the  judge’s  
role  and,  crucially,  of  the  improvising  judge’s  role.  Constraint  in  judicial  decision-­making  can  be  thought  of  in  two  
very  different,  but  inter-­related,  senses.  Firstly,  judges  often  face  bureaucratic  constraint  such  as  targets,  
timelines,  and  limited  resources.  Such  constraint  can  limit  possibilities  for  effective  decision-­making  and  for  
achieving  the  best  possible,  and  most  just,  outcome  in  a  particular  case.  This  type  of  constraint  can  be  
understood  as  requiring  an  improvisatory  response.  Secondly,  however,  constraint  in  the  judicial  role  can  also  be  
self-­imposed  where  judges  actively  apply  constraints  on  their  work,  and  that  of  other  professionals  around  them,  
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to  productively  guide  action.  Such  self-­imposed  constraints  may  aid  the  improvising  judge  in  her  role,  especially  
in  responding  to  bureaucratic  pressures  and  so  become  in  themselves  an  improvisatory  response.  We  will  
consider  each  of  these  ideas  of  constraint  in  turn.    
  
In  a  legal  system  where  limited  economic  resources  and  lengthy  case  times  are  increasingly  prevalent,  judges  
face  a  myriad  of  bureaucratic  constraints  to  reduce  costs  and  time  spent  deciding  a  case.  One  example  of  this  in  
the  area  of  family  law  is  recent  reform  in  England  and  Wales  requiring  child  protection  cases  to  be  processed  
within  twenty-­six  weeks  (see  Welbourne).  Similar  reform  has  not  yet  taken  place  in  Northern  Ireland  where  our  
research  took  place,  but  pressure  to  considerably  reduce  delay  is  nevertheless  palpable.  While  the  judges  we  
interviewed  were  indeed  concerned  to  reduce  delay,  few  agreed  that  introduction  of  a  strict  timeline  approach  
was  beneficial  in  terms  of  reaching  a  just  result,  or  in  assisting  judges  to  respond  effectively  to  the  singularity  of  
the  case  in  front  of  them.  As  one  judge  stated,  “my  own  view  is,  although  avoiding  delay  is  important,  
shoehorning  a  case  into  a  particular  number  of  weeks,  is  not  necessarily  producing  the  best  outcome  for  the  
child.”  Another  agreed,  expressing  the  dangers  of  injustice  to  the  lives  involved  that  could  result  if  a  timeline  
approach  was  adopted  in  Northern  Ireland:  “these  are  very  vulnerable  people  that  we  are  dealing  with,  and  
sometimes  people  need  time  to  really  understand  what  is  expected,  and  what  the  requirements  are.”  Such  
comments,  which  reflect  a  broad  consensus  amongst  our  interviewees,  indicate  that  bureaucratic  constraints  are  
not  productive  in  advancing  good  judicial  decision-­making,  nor  necessarily  the  interests  of  justice.  
  
While  a  critical  practice  of  improvisation  does  not  hold  possibilities  to  solve  all  bureaucratic  constraints  placed  
upon  judges,  it  does  offer  possibilities  to  create  awareness  of  spaces  and  resources  that  may  be  drawn  upon  to  
work  productively  within  these  constraints.  Bureaucratic  constraint  may  be  productively  negotiated  in  the  pursuit  
of  justice  through  an  improvisatory  response,  using  the  skills  of  improvisation  more  consciously  to  work  with  and  
through  bureaucratic  challenges.  Judging  in  a  context  of  increasingly  demanding  constraints  imposed  from  the  
system  itself  may  be  enhanced  through  foregrounding  and  consciously  utilising  improvisational  resources  such  
as  responsiveness,  adaptability,  alertness  to  singularity,  and  rejection  of  a  “right  answer”  approach.  These  
resources  can  offer  a  counter  to  bureaucratic  constraints,  and  can  help  facilitate  just  outcomes  within  a  system  
where  singularity  is  being  pushed  out,  encouraging  judges  to  resist  attempts  to  advance  cases  through  the  court  
system  by  whatever  means  and  as  quickly  as  possible  at  the  expense  of  justice.  Improvisation  in  the  context  of  
bureaucratic  constraints  such  as  the  proposed  twenty-­six  week  timeline  in  child  protection  cases  does  not  mean  
undertaking  judgment  in  a  more  hasty  or  less  thoughtful  way,  but  indeed  the  very  opposite.  It  seeks  to  encourage  
judges  to  be  especially  aware  of  the  dangers  of  closing  their  eyes  and  ears  to  singularity  in  the  pressure  of  an  
over-­stretched  system,  and  ensuring  that  singularity  remains  foregrounded.    
  
In  our  discussions  with  judges,  however,  a  second  idea  of  constraint  emerged  which  may  be  productively  
engaged.  Constraint  can  also  be  detected  as  a  resource  productively  used  by  judges  in  the  sense  of  self-­
imposed  constraint  to  facilitate  good  judicial  decision-­making.  One  example  of  this  where  judges  utilize  constraint  
to  facilitate  effective  responses  to  singularity  is  that  of  case  management  where  judges  set  key  dates  for  action  
and  timetabled  a  case  so  to  ensure  that  unproductive  delay  was  minimized.  This  involved  encouraging  
themselves  and  other  professionals  to  work  to  those  dates  while,  unlike  the  twenty-­six  week  approach  above,  
according  flexibility  as  required.  As  one  judge  commented,    
  
Cases  have  got  to  be  actively  case  managed.  And  what  that  means  is  at  each  review  you've  got  to  
have  a  purpose.  You've  got  to  have  read  the  papers  that  have  come  in  since  the  last  review,  you've  
got  to  see  whether  they  raise  any  more  questions  that  you  haven't  thought  of,  and  you've  got  to  do  
something  purposeful  at  the  review.  
  
Similarly,  another  judge  explained  their  approach  to  such  self-­imposed  constraint  in  the  following  terms:    
  
I've  already  said  that  [I  don’t  endorse]  the  guillotine  of  a  particular  set  of  or  period  of  weeks,  but,  
setting  regularly  reviews,  regular  court  appearances,  regular  opportunities  for  parties  to  object,  if  
something  is  not  being  done,  or  to  change  direction,  if  that  needs  to  be  done.  I  think  that's  the  way  
forward,  as  far  as  we're  concerned,  just  to  try  to  keep  the  cases  constantly  in  front  of  us,  and  
constantly  see  what  we  can  do  to  improve  things.    
  
There  is  evidence  of  judges  adopting  such  self-­imposed  constraint  as  a  means  of  responding  effectively  to  
bureaucratic  pressures  placed  upon  them,  and  doing  so  in  a  way  that  works  with  the  resources  they  have  to  
encourage  the  best  outcome  for  a  case.  Another  judge  explained  their  approach  in  the  following  terms:    
  
I  have  kicked  ass  around  my  court  day  in  and  day  out,  and  demanded  that  assessments  were  done  
more  quickly  than  I  was  told  they  could  be  done.  There  is  delay  everywhere.  If  there  has  to  be  an  
assessment,  “well,  we  have  to  make  a  referral  first  to  the  resource  panel  to  see  will  they  pay  for  it,”  
even  though  the  judge  has  said,  “I  want  it  done.”  Then  there  will  be  a  waiting  list  possibly  for  the  
family  center,  then  the  family  center  not  unusually  will  say:  “we're  not  going  to  do  any  work  until  we  
have  a  psychological  assessment  of  the  parents”  .  .  .  so  my  approach  was  to  take  every  single  case  
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and,  in  respect  of  every  aspect  of  the  case,  look  at  ways  in  which  things  could  be  done  more  
quickly—practical  ways—it  has  to  be  done  very  practically  for  a  judge.  But  it  was  very,  very  hard  
work.  And,  I  was  up  against  a  massive  system  where  delay  is  endemic.  
  
In  this  sense,  positive  constraints  placed  by  the  judge  on  herself  and  other  professionals  involved  in  the  case  to  
progress  it  more  effectively  can  be  a  powerful  tool,  and  looking  for  opportunities  where  this  can  be  done  is  
essential  in  a  system  where  time  and  resources  are  limited.  The  key  is  to  hone  this  skill  in  a  way  that  differs  from  
a  bureaucratic  approach  driven  by  statistics  as  opposed  to  the  interests  of  particular  cases.  A  critical  approach  to  
improvisation  can  fulfill  this  purpose,  stressing  the  importance  of  fluidity,  responsiveness,  and  adaptability  as  
crucial  to  justice,  but  as  taking  place  not  in  a  fully  free  way,  but  within  the  context  of  constraint  as  a  useful  and  
necessary  part  of  managing  complexity.  As  musician  David  Borgo  says,  “the  artist’s  role  is  to  show  how  we  can  
gracefully  deal  with  surprise  and  complexity.”  To  aid  in  this  process,  musician  Ellen  Waterman  emphasizes  the  
productive  nature  of  employing  constraint  in  the  form  of  rules:  “I  like  the  idea  of  rules  for  play.  We  don’t  operate  
outside  of  a  context.  It’s  very  important  that  we  learn  how  to  use  rules  and  relate  to  rules  in  a  positive  way.”  
Constraint,  self-­imposed  constraint  especially,  is  an  important  element  guiding  any  improvisational  activity  and  
one  which  judges  appear  already  to  be  engaging  with  to  enhance  just  outcomes.  This  is  an  integral  part  of  the  




From  the  above  analysis  and  our  discussions  with  judges  and  musicians  a  key  realization  emerges:  many  judges  
are  already  expert  improvisers,  using  a  range  of  improvisational  resources  to  manage  the  difficult  activity  of  
judicial  decision-­making.  Improvisation  is  already  happening  in  law,  and  indeed  is  a  crucial  thread  weaving  
through  judicial  work.  Space  does  exist,  however,  to  think  through  further,  or  more  consciously,  the  
improvisational  elements  of  the  judicial  role  and  judicial  skills.  When  we  do  this  a  critical  practice  of  improvisation  
may  begin  to  emerge  within  law  that  aims  to  foreground  the  singular  and  offers  tools  to  productively  advance  the  
aims  of  justice  in  a  challenging  and  demanding  system.  While  the  insights  and  experiences  of  musical  
improvisation  are  useful  in  this  emerging  approach  to  improvisation  in  law,  this  approach  must  be  considered  as  
fundamentally  contingent—emerging,  evolving,  and  shifting  in  relation  to  the  specific  context  of  law  and  particular  
contexts  for  judging.    
  
In  thinking  through  such  a  contingent  approach  to  improvisation  in  law,  it  is  important  to  recognize  that  judges  are  
the  experts  who  are  highly  skilled  in  employing  a  number  of  improvisation  skills  already  in  their  everyday  
decision-­making.  The  legal  system  must  recognize  this  expertise  to  allow  judges  to  make  the  best  decisions.  
Indeed,  our  research  shows  that  this  is  not  just  the  case  for  judges,  but  also  for  other  professional  legal  
practitioners  who  often  feel  similarly  restricted  by  the  bureaucratic  system  within  which  they  operate.  This  system  
demonstrates  trends  towards  a  marginalization  of  singularity,  limited  space  for  effective  and  holistic  listening,  
responsiveness  and  adaptability  as  well  as  an  advancement  of  bureaucracy  over  expertise.  Even  if  the  system  
cannot  change,  however,  judges  and  other  legal  professionals  can.  The  improvisatorial  nature  of  law,  judicial  
decision-­making  in  particular,  and  judges’  expertise  as  improvisers  stands  to  be  more  consciously  recognized  
and  engaged  with  by  these  professionals  themselves.  Bringing  this  improvisatorial  expertise  into  view  is  
something  that  needs  to  be  developed,  fostered,  and  practiced,  just  like  any  other  skill.  
  
In  advancing  a  critical  approach  to  improvisation,  we  suggest  that  foregrounding  contingency  is  crucial,  
foregrounding  improvisation  itself  as  a  context-­specific  activity  capable  of  development  in  new  ways  to  better  
meet  ever-­emerging  challenges  in  diverse  locations  from  music  to  law.  Our  advancement  of  a  contingent  
approach  to  improvisation  in  law  in  this  sense  has  implications  for  how  we  understand  the  concept  of  
improvisation  more  generally.  It  is  essential  that  as  a  concept  and  practice  improvisation  is  kept  unsettled,  
embraced  as  an  open-­ended  ideal  as  opposed  to  a  static  and  abstract  concept.  In  doing  so  we  are  retaining  a  
critical  perspective  to  improvisation  itself,  to  how  we  conceptualize  it  more  broadly,  and  to  what  it  might  become  
in  the  future.  Just  as  a  critical  approach  to  improvisation  is  required  in  law  to  challenge  spaces  of  comfort  which  
do  not  serve  the  ends  of  justice,  so  too  is  a  critical  approach  to  the  idea  of  improvisation  itself  imperative,  
rejecting  the  comfort  of  a  false,  abstract  universal,  in  order  to  retain  the  critical  force  that  the  concept  and  practice  
of  improvisation  may  offer.  
Notes  
1  This  is  very  much  an  emergent  area  of  thought.  For  related  work  see  Ramshaw,  Justice;;  Ramshaw,  “Jamming”;;  
Manderson;;  Piper;;  Marisi.    
2  See,  for  example,  Fischlin;;  Fischlin  and  Heble;;  Heble  and  Waterman;;  Heble  and  Siemerling;;  Heble.  
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3  Due  to  the  sensitive  nature  of  judicial  decision-­making  generally,  and  in  the  context  of  Northern  Ireland  in  
particular,  all  direct  quotations  from  judicial  interview  participants  have  been  anonymized.  Musicians  have  
consented  to  use  of  full  names.    
4  The  project  is  directed  by  Sara  Ramshaw  (PI)  and  Paul  Stapleton  (Co-­I).  For  further  information  visit:  
http://www.translatingimprovisation.com/ahrc  
5  For  discussion  on  this  point  thoughts  may  be  directed  to  Judith  Butler’s  conception  of  the  relationship  between  
universality  and  contingency  (“Universality”;;  Undoing  190-­191;;  Butler,  Laclau  and  Žižek).    
6  See,  for  example,  the  idea  of  the  “welfare  of  the  child”  in  Article  3  of  the  Children  Order  (NI)  1989  which  is  the  
paramount  consideration  guiding  judicial  decision-­making  in  child  law  cases,  but  offers  room  for  wide  discretion  
as  to  what  this  requires  in  a  particular  case.    
7  See  also  Dworkin  Taking  Rights;;  Dworkin  “No  Right.”  
8  For  wider  discussion  of  anticipation  and  music  more  generally  see  Huron.  For  a  cognitive  science  approach  to  
understanding  music  improvisation  where  anticipation  is  quantitatively  studied  see  Pressing.    
9  In  the  context  of  family  law,  the  area  pertinent  to  our  project,  the  need  to  listen  to  the  voice  of  the  child,  and  the  
absence  of  such  voices  from  legal  proceedings,  has  also  been  a  dominant  theme  (Raitt;;  Parkinson  and  
Cashmore;;  Taylor).    
10  See  generally  “Part  1:  Listening”  in  The  Improvisation  Studies  Reader  (Heble  and  Caines,  eds.),  which  features  
texts  on  the  subject  of  listening  by  George  Lipsitz,  Jean-­Luc  Nancy,  Ingrid  Monson,  Pauline  Oliveros,  and  others.    
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